NBA - Artigos e Análises Estatísticas para discussão

[Carson Wentz]

Joe Johnson, Kobe Bryant are league's least cost-effective players

Tom Ziller - SB Nation

 

As you might expect, neither of New York's highest paid players -- Amar'e Stoudemire and Joe Johnson -- produce up to the level their contracts require. Kobe Bryant is also not terribly cost-effective. The Hook digs into the data.

 

 

On Monday, we looked at the most cost-effective players in the league. It's a list dominated by youth, with a smattering of veteran free agents from the bargain bin mixed in. When you look at the other end of the cost-effectiveness spectrum, a different type dominates: the veteran scoring star.

 

Ignoring players who have missed the whole season -- and those are the truly least cost-effective players -- a pattern emerges. Of the 10 least cost-effective players in the NBA this season who have played at least 40 games, four are in their 30s. All but two of the top 10 averaged 20 points per game at least once in their careers before signing their current contracts. And veteran scorers sure aren't cheap.

 

Here's the 10 least cost-effective stars who have played at least 40 games this season. As with Monday's piece, all data is from Basketball-Reference and current as of March 10. The caveats are that non-box score defense is undercounted and that I made no adjustments for anything. "Ringz" is not a category for which I gave a boost. We just take the production (using a modified version of Hollinger's PER), multiply by the league's average dollars per unit of production and compare it to actual salaries. And we come up with ...

 

• 
   
  
• 1 - Joe Johnson, Nets, worth $8.8 million, paid $19.7 million, deficit of $10.8 million
  
• 2 - Kobe Bryant, Lakers, worth $17.3 million, paid $27.8 million, deficit of $10.5 million
  
• 3 - Richard Jefferson, Warriors, worth $1.5 million, paid $10.5 million, deficit of $8.6 million
  
• 4 - Kris Humphries, Nets, worth $3.4 million, paid $12 million, deficit of $8.6 million
  
• 5 - Dwight Howard, Lakers, worth $10.9 million, paid $19.5 million, deficit of $8.6 million
  
• 6 - Andris Biedrins, Warriors, worth $949,000, paid $9 million, deficit of $8 million
  
• 7 - Carmelo Anthony, Knicks, worth $12.4 million, paid $20.4 million, deficit of $8 million
  
• 8 - Stephen Jackson, Spurs, worth $2.2 million, paid $10 million, deficit of $7.8 million
  
• 9 - Rudy Gay, Grizzlies/Raptors, worth $8.9 million, paid $16.4 million, deficit of $7.5 million
  
• 10 - Ben Gordon, Bobcats, worth $5.1 million, paid $12.4 million, deficit of $7.2 million
  

 

Biedrins and Hump are the only two without 20-point-per-game seasons on their previous contracts. Jefferson, 'Melo, Gay and Gordon were known almost exclusively as scorers before signing their current massive contracts; Johnson (playmaking) and Kobe (defense) did other things, too, but were most notorious for their scoring. Biedrins is wildly overpaid primarily because he is ridiculously unproductive, and Hump is a special case. (Asterisk: Prokhorov.) Howard is a recent MVP candidate having (until the past few weeks) a poor season. Jackson was a reputed scorer but also one of the league's more hyped defenders when he signed his current deal.

 

I like to think that 10 years ago the least cost-effective list would have been littered with more unproductive big men. Now, seven out of the 10 are wings. (There are a few more big men in this range who didn't meet the games requirement.)

 

Age has an undeniable impact here for two reasons. As players like Jefferson and, to a lesser extent, Bryant, Johnson and Jackson get older, they lose their ability to produce at high levels. Contracts don't typically account for that -- teams pay for the downside so they ensure they can also get the prime. Johnson's contract is an example: the Hawks signed J.J. looking at about two more years of the star's prime and four years of career twilight. To them, getting the first two was worth paying for the last four. That they found a sucker team to take on those four years is a bonus. (And of course, the Nets made the case to themselves that the first couple years of their J.J. experience would be worth paying for likely less production on the backend of that deal.)

 

Speaking of which: Amar'e Stoudemire. He didn't meet the 40-game cut-off for the above list. If you double his games played and by extension his production this season (bringing him to 58 games) ... he would be No. 3 on this list, with a deficit of $10.3 million. There are also two big men who have each played more than 30 games and would be high on the list if they met the cut-off: Dirk Nowitzki and Pau Gasol. Pau may not be a surprise. But Dirk? Yep.

 

The other reason age plays a factor is because of the way NBA contracts are structured. With the rookie scale and limitations on players' second contracts -- no more than 25 percent of the cap except when the Rose Rule is invoked -- veterans always have the fattest contracts. So with giant contracts, of course they'll be more likely to be less cost-effective in the aggregate. Players making less than $7 million can't even compete with this crew.

 

But if we change the measure from total value deficit to highest cost per unit of production, you get a different list, and one highly dependent on games and minutes played. For all players with at least 10 games played, Hedo Turkoglu is the least cost-effective player, costing $733,000 per unit of production. (League average cost is about $14,000 per unit.) With at least 20 games played, it's DeSagana Diop, who costs $255,000 per unit of production. If you make the cut-off 30, 40 or 50 games, Biedrins is your leader at a per-unit cost of $132,000, almost 10 times the league average. At the 30-game level, Jefferson, Jared Jeffries, Jason Collins and Daequan Cook follow. At the 40-game level, it's Biedrins, Jefferson, Stephen Jackson, Humphries and Mike Miller. At the 50-game level you have Biedrins, Hump, Gordon, Joe Johnson and Lamar Odom.

 

To put Johnson's contract in perspective, his per-unit cost is only a little more than twice league average. He produces a lot. But he's supremely expensive.

 

And that gets to a central issue in all of this: Sometimes, it's okay to not be cost-effective.

 

Remember, in Monday's piece looking at the most cost-effective players in the league, we found a dearth of stars. The "stars" of cost-effectiveness are all role players. Again, much of this is due to how contracts work: young players have more salary restrictions than older players. But it's also how the market works, and how teams are built: you go after stars you will be lots and lots of money for, then you augment with cost-effective pieces. You just need to end up with the right stars and the right role players. It proves more difficult for some GMs than others.

 

So in no way would you look at the list at the top of this list and ascertain that Kobe is not worth his deal. His production is worth a ton. To sign all of that production at this point, you have to pay a premium. That's the cost, and other teams would gladly pay it. Unless you can replace all of that production -- which only a couple players provide right now -- you're going to lose it if you refuse to pay. With players other than Kobe, this is where the trade market comes in. Do you spend a premium to get Kobe's elite production, or do you decide you can break up that $27 million in pieces that produce in the aggregate at Kobe's level? That is basically the basis of NBA personnel economics: Deciding how exactly to spend a somewhat fixed level of resources on production.

 

Again, we'll readdress this whole discipline when free agency approaches.

 

E aqui está a segunda parte do artigo que tinha posto anteriormente. Desta vez os jogadores que têm pior relação produção-preço.

[zlatanzinho]

Biedriens :lol: tão mau jogador, não percebo como tem um contrato daqueles.

[andriy pereplyotkin]

Ó Mesquita, esse grupo do top 10 de dollars per unit of production cai de parte quando o PJ Tucker não está aí. Não faço ideia qual é a estatística, mas é redondamente falível. Desse grupo todo só diria que o Parsons e o Faried poderão estar em melhores condições de relação custo/produção. A questão aí é que boa parte dessa malta joga com as 2nd units, e isso deve ser uma estatística de %s e relacionada com números.

[Carson Wentz]

A estatística usada é um PER adaptado. E diria que o Vásquez também estaria à frente. Agora realmente é estranho. No segundo artigo sei que usam um critério (jogadores com mais de 40 jogos feitos), no primeiro supostamente entra toda a gente.

[Carson Wentz]

How the Griz Can Survive Without Marc Gasol

Kellymelvina - Grizzly Bear Blues

 

With no Marc Gasol, the Memphis Grizzlies will have to focus on running more and going small.

 

 

Well, I'm sure you heard the news by now. Marc Gasol is out indefinitely due to an abdominal tear he re-aggravated against the New Orleans Hornets Pelicans. No one knows how long he's going to be out. Indefinitely could mean he misses the rest of the regular season, a week, or just last night's game. For some perspective, Chris Bosh's abdominal strain caused him to miss two weeks in the playoffs last season.

 

But in the thick of the playoff race, there isn't time for excuses. Despite missing their best defensive player and best playmaker, this team can adjust on the fly. Last night's game against the Boston Celtics was proof of that. Instead of the "in the mud" approach, they changed the way they play. It was quite simple: They ran.

 

This is a slow team. Instead of running they beat teams up down low. Since the Rudy Gay trade the Grizzlies have the slowest pace (90.57) in the league and are 20th in fast break points per game (11.8). The offense that Hollins runs doesn't require speed; moreso the playmaking of Marc Gasol in the high-low. But for now, that's gone, and now this team has to run and keep the tempo up.

 

Last night against the Celtics, the Griz played with a relatively high pace of 95.44 according to NBA.com/stats, which is comparable to the Atlanta Hawks and San Antonio Spurs. Granted it was a Celtics team playing on the second night of a back to back after a loss to the Dallas Mavericks, but this team adjusted well without Wendigo.

 

With Zach Randolph not starting to do alarm clock issues, the Ed Davis/Darrell Arthur lineup allowed the Grizzlies to play at a high speed. That speed also increased once Jerryd Bayless entered the game. They won't be able to rely on Bayless scoring 30 points a game, but lately he's been the money man off the bench scoring 20.2 points on 54.4 percent in his last five contest. Once they get the offensive rebounds, instead of waiting for each big to get down the floor they'll have to force the issue with either Mike Conley or Jerryd leading the break.

 

With Zach Randolph not starting to do alarm clock issues, the Ed Davis/Darrell Arthur lineup allowed the Grizzlies to play at a high speed. That speed also increased once Jerryd Bayless entered the game. They won't be able to rely on Bayless scoring 30 points a game, but lately he's been the money man off the bench scoring 20.2 points on 54.4 percent in his last five contest. Once they get the offensive rebounds, instead of waiting for each big to get down the floor they'll have to force the issue with either Mike Conley or Jerryd leading the break.

 

Another way to take a small advantage is the small-ball lineup. Several times Hollins played with a big and Tayshaun Prince together in the front court. In seven minutes the Prince-Randolph-Bayless-Conley-Allen lineup posted a net rating of +23.3. That's a small sample size, but something that could be a trend going forward. To start the second half Hollins went with the normal starting lineup to match up with Boston's small ball. And with the league mostly trending that way, it'll come in handy now and in the future.

 

Prince is built perfectly to play the new stretch four position that's taking the league by storm. He can defend small or power forwards, can create from the perimeter and can create with his back to the basket. He isn't the passer that Gasol was in the post, but the idea here isn't to recreate everything that Gasol was doing. If that was the case the team wouldn't have to adjust. The team also isn't losing anything by playing small. Tony Allen's an all-class defender meaning whether it's a guard or a small forward, he's completely capable of defending them. He helped blanket Paul Pierce in the 2nd half. He's proven his like against the likes of Kevin Durant. And Bayless, despite lacking height, has the strength to go toe-to-toe with shooting guards. And if he's struggling Quincy Pondexter has the size to defend opposing two's.

 

But now comes the question of how do you replace Gasol's efforts on defense. And this is where I swallow some pride. Unless Hollins is going to go with the small-ball lineup I mentioned previously and simply rely on offense instead of defense, he's going to have to start Ed Davis.

 

If you follow me on twitter you'll know that I haven't been as impressed with Boss Davis as everyone else has. He often looks lost on offense, is far too small to defend centers, gets bullied on the boards and is a terrible free throw shooter. While most of basketball twitter raves about him, I just haven't been impressed with his play during his tenure with the Griz. And yet at 6'10, he's what the Grizzlies need in order to maintain some of the dignity when it comes to their defense. There won't be problems on the perimeter; there isn't a better defensive trio at the 1-2-3 positions than Conley-Tony Allen-Tayshaun Prince. But the lack of someone in the paint to contest shots causes those three to have to over-compensate on defense.

 

Davis displayed why he'll be key until Gasol returns and may set up the bench rotation from then on until the playoffs. Despite his weight, his height and athleticism will be key. In 18 minutes of play, Davis collected 5 blocks. All but one of his blocks were due to great help defense. He isn't likely to block every shot that comes his way, but if you play hoops you know that when there's a shot-blocking presence on the court it changes the way you attack the paint. Some players become passive while some hoist up erratic shots. Of course there becomes the problem of Ed Davis averaging 4.9 fouls per-36 minutes. Also whether Hollins will give him the burn he deserves.

 

But this teams needs someone that can defend. Even if Jerryd scores 20 a night, this team isn't built to outscore opponents every night. They struggled to defeat a broken down Celtics team, so there will be gleaming problems. The next 5 games on the schedule stand as @ Washington, @ New York, vs Houston, @ Minnesota and an important division game vs San Antonio. Being the 5th seeded team (.5 games behind LAC, 1 game behind DEN), Lionel's adjustments on the fly will be extremely crucial if they want home-court advantage going into the playoffs. If this was the Lionel Hollins from last season or during the December-January stretch of the season, I'd lose all faith in his ability to coach on the fly, but lately he's shown why he's a top coach in the season.

 

Por acaso vi o jogo quase todo contra os C's e concordo basicamente com tudo. E também tenho muito interesse como é que o Ed Davis conseguirá segurar as pontas. Ofensivamente têm bastante soluções que podem resultar, defensivamente vai depender muito do Ed, embora ter o Tayshaun seja uma ajuda do caralhão.

[Bynum Lover]

http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=espn:9107858

 

 

Vídeo interessante. Acham que as regras da NBA são pouco severas sobre este tipo de faltas e que isso está a tirar espectáculo ao jogo? Acham que as grandes estrelas estão a ser travadas de mostrar todo o seu potencial pois têm medo de sair lesionadas? É verdade que cada vez mais, são as equipas mais duras que têm sucesso na NBA, talvez desde a famosa equipa dos Bad Boys de Detroit, claro que é preciso fantasia e magia no ataque com Lebron/Wade, Durant/Westbrook, Parker/Duncan, Kobe/Gasol, etc etc, mas a verdade é que por exemplo OKC defende muito agressivo, os Spurs também se precisarem de uma hard foul, não têm medo de a fazer, Chicago e Boston também são assim, Indiana idem.

E se pensar bem, até acho que há cada vez menos grandes dunks de super-estrelas como havia antigamente.

Faltas extra-jogo(agarrar, empurrar), ou faltas agressivas ou que parem um contra-ataque no futebol são punidas com um cartão amarelo, dado que no basket não há isso, talvez devessem ser todas flagrant 1 ou assim. Não falo de faltas duras em que se tenta fazer um block ou assim, pois para se fazer um block tem de se ser agressivo, principalmente em transição, mas quando tentam abafar com uma mão e a outra dá na cara de um jogador, ou assim, acho que deviam ter uma punição mais pesada.

[El Colosso]

Por muito que se tente fazer passar isso, ainda não chegamos aos niveis dos Bad Boys e dos Knicks dos anos 90. Porque raio é que uma equipa devia deixar um jogador da outra equipa marcar à vontade? Enquanto não se quebrar nenhuma regra, que se faça tudo o que é possivel para parar o outro jogador.

 

E a cena do LeBron e do Kirk é ridicula, o LeBron se não tentasse sacar um And 1 não se estava a ter esta conversa

[LgD]

http://clnsradio.com/2013/03/26/kobe-bryant-exposing-myths-arguments-fallacies-define-his-inflated-greatness/

 

Kobe Bryant myths

[Taka]

O nome do artigo devia ser "Como convencer alguém que Kobe Bryant é um jogador vulgar"

[LgD]

Não é um jogador vulgar, ele apenas está a debater mitos sobre ele que toda a gente diz..

[Osnofa]

epá...homepage já.

[Taka]

Não é um jogador vulgar, ele apenas está a debater mitos sobre ele que toda a gente diz..

 

Não é? Pelo texto, ele faz-me crer que aparecer alguém como o Kobe é algo que acontece com alguma frequência na NBA.

 

E, já agora, clutchness não são só os últimos 24 segundos. Alguém que diga ao homem.

[LgD]

É certo que ele exagera um pouco, mas para mim o Kobe está pelo menos no top 20 de sempre, ele apenas mostrou estatísticas que mostram que, por exemplo, o mito dele ser clutch é errado.

 

E quanto à parte dos 24 segundos

 

in the regular season and playoffs, in the 4th quarter or overtime, 5:00 or less left in quarter, scoring margin between -5 and 5 points

 

12/13 42-99 FG, 42.4%

11/12 51-145 FG, 35.2%

10/11 54-139 FG, 38.8%

09/10 57-133 FG, 42.9%

08/09 67-150 FG, 44.7%

07/08 58-127 FG, 45.7%

06/07 64-159 FG, 40.3%

05/06 55-148 FG, 37.2%

04/05 35-108 FG, 32.4%

03/04 43-116 FG, 37.1%

02/03 51-131 FG, 38.9%

01/02 44-121 FG, 36.4%

00/01 61-132 FG, 46.2%

 

É isto? 39,9% FG desde 2000/2001?

[Taka]

Correcto, é isso mesmo :fixe:

[Osnofa]

O gajo exagera, é verdade, mas tem razão no que diz. O Kobe é um grande jogador mas simplesmente não é o deus que fazem dele, nunca foi.

[Perdigas]

´Tens umas palas do tamanho do universo Afonso.

[Osnofa]

´Tens umas palas do tamanho do universo Afonso.

 

epá tudo bem que sou hater do Kobe mas não disse mentira nenhuma naquele post. Ele não é nenhum deus e o gajo do artigo expõe isso, exageradamente mas no geral é isso.

[Perdigas]

epá tudo bem que sou hater do Kobe mas não disse mentira nenhuma naquele post. Ele não é nenhum deus e o gajo do artigo expõe isso, exageradamente mas no geral é isso.

Claro que é. Um dos grandes da modalidade. Tal como o Timmy o é, se és incapaz de ver isso não sei que te diga. Quer dizer, até sei, mas prefiro guarda-lo para mim.

[Odom]

de referir ainda que o autor desse artigo é de Boston :mrgreen:

[Osnofa]

Tá num top 15 de certeza absoluta e cabe num top 10 sem problemas nenhuns. E digo exactamente o mesmo para o Duncan.

 

O que está aqui em discussão é o que se faz do jogador. O Kobe é/foi um grande jogador mas, por exemplo, nunca foi um Jordan e sempre houve muitíssimas comparações com ele. Lá que ele é um dos grandes da modalidade, isso nunca esteve em discussão.

[Rafinha]

The Evolution of LeBron James: http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/9109245/how-lebron-james-transformed-game-become-highly-efficient-scoring-machine

[Carson Wentz]

Muito interessante, especialmente a parte sobre o trabalho com o Hakeem e o passo atrás para dar um passo à frente nos 3-pointers.

[vakjew]

Learning From Gregg Popovich

Jonathan Tjarks - Real GM

 

Voting for Coach of the Year can be extremely tricky. In the last decade, Mike D’Antoni, Avery Johnson and Mike Brown have been fired twice since winning the award. Since the NBA is ultimately a player’s game, much of a coach’s fate is out of his own hands. At the same time, the media tends to reward the coach of a team that exceeds expectations, even when it’s more the result of a superstar carrying an entire franchise (Brown in Cleveland) or a natural step in the progression of a young team (Scott Brooks with the Oklahoma City Thunder). This season, a number of coaches have done excellent work, but as usual, few can compare with the job Gregg Popovich has done with the San Antonio Spurs.

 

Popovich, who won the award in 2003 and 2012, is the longest-tenured coach in the NBA. Since taking over the Spurs in 1997, he’s never won fewer than 53 games in a full season. That success starts with Tim Duncan, but it’s not easy to reshuffle a roster around an elite player that many times, especially when you never have the benefit of another high draft pick. As the coach of a small-market team who can’t afford to spend money in free agency, Popovich has learned to play for the present while still keeping an eye on the future. There’s no one better at it, which is why San Antonio has remained a championship contender long after their window should have closed.

 

The Spurs' gaudy win percentages have remained constant, but the 2013 edition is their best team since 2007. With Duncan aging, San Antonio’s defense slipped steadily in the years following their last championship, culminating in their collapse against the Thunder in the 2012 Western Conference Finals. This season, the emergence of Tiago Splitter and Kawhi Leonard has given them badly needed length and athleticism in their front-court. As a result, their team defensive rating has improved from 10th in 2012 to 3rd in 2013. Their size gives them at least a puncher’s chance against Miami or Oklahoma City in a seven-game playoff series, since both prefer to spread the floor with only one big man.

 

And while a lot of coaches could integrate Leonard and Splitter into their rotation, few would have had the patience to develop them over such a long period of time. They are the endpoints of a process that began all the way back in 2007. In that year’s draft, San Antonio selected Splitter at No. 28, even though he wouldn’t come over from Europe for another three seasons. Leonard, meanwhile, is exactly the type of skilled and athletic two-way front-court player the Spurs should have been too picking low to acquire. The only reason they could move up to No. 15 in 2011 and select him is that they had done such a good job of developing George Hill, the No. 26 pick in 2008.

 

San Antonio valued the back end of the draft way before it was the cool thing to do. Even though Hill was somewhat of a project as a 6’2 combo guard coming out of a mid-major school like IUPUI, Popovich thrust him into the fire as a rookie. Over the next three seasons, as his shooting and decision-making improved, Hill became when one of the best backup PG’s in the NBA. So when Indiana was looking for a starting PG to round out their team in in 2011, the Spurs had one ready for them. That’s where Popovich’s ability to see the long-term makes him a great coach: he has a better player in 2013 because he was willing to take the lumps from 2008-2012.

 

Once he got Leonard, Popovich wasn’t afraid to put him on the floor immediately. That’s an unusual move for a coach in his position. Brooks, in comparison, has stubbornly stuck with Derek Fisher over the last two seasons, even though he hasn’t been a useful NBA player in many years. Logically, a coach willing to roll the dice on a one-dimensional 38-year-old 6’2 shooting guard should be willing to play Jeremy Lamb, the No. 12 pick in 2012. Leonard wasn’t any more ready for the NBA than Lamb; he just had a coach who could identify talent and knew how to get the best out of every player given to him. Leonard was a 25% three-point shooter in college whose become a marksmen (38%) from the deeper NBA line. That rarely happens.

 

More than any other coach in the NBA, Popovich isn’t wedded to a player’s reputation. Michael Finley, a two-time All-Star, started the 2010 season as the Spurs SG. However, it quickly became clear that he had hit the age-35 wall and Popovich turned to Hill, only in his second season. If Finley had played for the Thunder, Brooks would probably still have him around for his veteran leadership. In contrast, if Popovich coached in Oklahoma City, he would almost certainly play Reggie Jackson a lot more minutes. The same goes for Eric Bledsoe with the Clippers. Not only is it the obvious thing to do from a strategic perspective, it makes them more valuable assets on the trade market.

 

This season, Popovich has cut the minutes of accomplished veterans like Manu Ginobili, Stephen Jackson and Boris Diaw in order to get younger players on the floor. Unlike Vinny Del Negro or Brooks, who often cite “chemistry” as why they can’t make changes to their starting lineup, Popovich is proactively searching for the most effective combinations to put on the floor. You can’t be afraid to hurt guys feelings if you want to win. Popovich started DeJuan Blair for most of two seasons and he’s not even in the rotation anymore. Compare that to how Brooks has leaned on Kendrick Perkins regardless of what the statistics and the eyeball test are telling him.

 

All of this is possible because Popovich has had the luxury of installing a system over an incredibly long period of time. The Spurs have more continuity than any other team in the NBA, which allows their front office to identify players who could fit specific roles in Popovich’s system. In effect, the great job he’s done coaching from 1997-2012 has made his job in 2013 that much easier. His effect on the roster has compounded over time, which is why it’s nearly impossible for any of his peers to match the job he has done in San Antonio. He’s on the level of a Coach K or a Jim Boeheim in terms of his impact on his franchise, an almost impossible feat for an NBA coach.

[Carson Wentz]

Pop. :prayer: Por alguma coisa se aponta os Spurs como um dos melhores (o melhor?) franchise a pickar no draft. Mais do que saber identificar onde está o talento está a capacidade de saber onde e como é preciso adicioná-lo.

 

Não tinha noção da evolução absurda do Leonard nos 3 pontos. E mesmo o Danny Green tinha 27.3% (só fez 20 jogos, but still, vinha com média de 37.4% do college) em Cleveland e está com 44,4% esta época.

[Pat Riley]

Esse artigo tá qualquer coisa.

 

E estou curioso para ver o que vem a seguir, quando o Duncan e o Manu se forem. Será que é um fim de um ciclo e o Pop se vai embora também? Ou participará no moroso processo de rebuilding que a equipa vai precisar?