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[LgD]

Sou o único aí 2 vezes :prayer:

[Pat Riley]

Anatomy of a Deal: Kawhi Leonard for George Hill

Nearly two years later, we look back on the Spurs-Pacers trade, which has had huge implications for the 2013 conference finals

 

Dennis Lindsey and David Morway were texting furiously. It was still the early stages of the 2011 NBA draft, but the upper-level executives with the Spurs and Pacers, respectively, were plotting something. Sometime around the no. 11 pick, they decided it was time to just get on the phone. The Spurs had already agreed to send George Hill to the Pacers for Indiana's no. 15 pick, but only if a particular player or players were still on the board. Both teams were worried the deal would not happen by the time Utah was on the clock at no. 12. The Pacers didn't even know which player the Spurs wanted, Morway says.

 

The Pacers had expressed interest in Hill almost from the moment San Antonio drafted him out of Indianapolis-based IUPUI in 2008, according to executives with both teams. The Pacers had nearly traded for Hill during the 2010 draft, with their no. 10 pick as bait, but backed out when their preferred draft target — Paul George — was still on the board. But a year after that near deal, Indiana thought Hill would be the perfect caretaker point guard for Frank Vogel's new inside-out offense, especially since it was confident it would sign a true starting power forward once the oncoming lockout lifted.1

 

But Morway was dubious as the 2011 draft unfolded. The Spurs had potential Hill-centric deals in place with teams above Indiana in the draft order, but couldn't complete any, because each of those teams found someone they liked still available, says R.C. Buford, San Antonio's GM. That meant the Spurs' pool of draftees was nearly empty by the time Morway and Lindsey started chatting.

 

Other teams that had talked with San Antonio about Hill were nervous the Spurs would back out at the last minute, anyway; several called top San Antonio executives during the draft just to make sure the Spurs were actually serious — that they'd go through with it. "We were worried and concerned right up until the last minute they might pull out," Morway says. The Spurs loved Hill, and had developed him from a guy who struggled terribly in his first summer league into an above-average two-way combo guard. Hill would be due an extension after the 2011-12 season, still a year away, and the Spurs anticipated it would take between $7 million and $9 million per year to retain him. They knew it would be hard to pay Hill at that level without going far into the luxury tax.

 

There were other ways to save money, and the Spurs explored them in hopes of keeping Gregg Popovich's favorite player, Buford says. They reportedly tried to peddle Richard Jefferson's awful contract, but couldn't find a taker. The post-lockout collective bargaining agreement, which wouldn't be signed until that December, might offer the relief of an amnesty clause, but that was far from certain, and such a clause would require the Spurs to pay out the amnesty victim's salary.

 

And then there was Tony Parker, on the books for $12.5 million annually through 2014-15.2 The Spurs reportedly engaged teams much higher in the draft about Parker, attaching Jefferson's contract as the poison price of obtaining one of the league's very best point guards. They didn't shop Parker, but they at least entertained the idea of going forward with Hill as the team's starting point guard. "We didn't make calls on Tony," Buford says. "We accepted calls from teams who had interest in Tony."

 

No such deal happened, leaving Morway and Lindsey to sweat things out. When the Jazz took Alec Burks with the no. 12 pick, Lindsey told Morway simply, "We're still alive." He repeated that again after the Suns and Rockets took the Morris twins with the next two picks. The teams were in business, but some last-minute details remained. The Spurs were torn about dealing Hill, and they wanted two assets in addition to the no. 15 pick — the rights to Erazem Lorbek, a rangy big man in Europe, and the no. 42 pick. The Pacers knew San Antonio coveted both, especially Lorbek, but they figured one would be enough to seal things. Nope. The Spurs requested both. "That night was the first time Larry [bird] and I entertained with our owner the idea of sending out both assets," Morway says. Buford recalls, "We just told them, 'This is what it's going to take for us to give up George Hill.' He was such a big part of our fiber and our culture. It took a significant opportunity for us to move him."3

 

The Pacers swallowed hard and agreed. There was still one problem left: Indiana loved Kawhi Leonard. The Pacers had him about no. 5 or no. 6 on their draft board, and they thought very hard about scrapping the Hill deal and just taking a guy they never expected to be alive at no. 15. "When Kawhi ended up being there, we had to think about taking him," Morway says. "But we already had Danny Granger and Paul George. That's what made it a little easier for us."

 

And so, with the clock ticking down on Indiana's pick, the teams agreed to the final deal. The Pacers picked Leonard, who dutifully stood up, showed the world his prom suit, crammed a Pacers hat onto his head, and shook the commissioner's hand. He had no clue he was about to be traded, though he remembered the Spurs interviewing him at the draft combine, even though they did not have a pick in or near the lottery. He was striding to his first round of media interviews when a league official shouted at him to stop — he might have already been traded. "It was a total shock to me," he says.

 

It was a shock to everyone, this weird deal that has since (allegedly) become the elusive win-win trade, featuring two players in crucial roles with teams that have a chance to meet in the Finals just two years later. San Antonio players were caught off guard when they heard the news, says Matt Bonner. "I was so surprised," he says. "I mean, George is a great player, someone the Spurs had drafted and developed."

 

Sometime near the moment Leonard stepped onto the draft lottery stage, Popovich, sitting in the Spurs draft room near Buford and Lindsey, picked up the phone. He wanted to tell Hill, whom he still calls "Georgie," about the trade himself. It might have been the most vulnerable Buford had ever seen Popovich, Buford says. "It was so emotional. I was there. I saw it. He was incredibly emotional." Buford wouldn't get into the details, as is the Spurs way. "I wouldn't do that," he says. "But it was very difficult."4

 

Both teams are thrilled with the outcome, part of the reason the Hill-Leonard trade has improbably emerged as one of the league's most interesting and talked-about deals of the last half-decade or so. But the smart money is on the deal emerging over the next couple seasons as much closer to a true San Antonio "win."

 

That's not to say the Pacers "lost" the deal, or even that it's not a "win" for them, too. They're going toe-to-toe with Miami, and Hill has fit within their team almost exactly as the Pacers had hoped when they acquired him. And though it's tempting to think what a George-Leonard wing combination might have been able to do on defense, Indiana's defense is already the stingiest in the league. Collison, the point guard Hill supplanted and then made expendable, couldn't earn Rick Carlisle's trust in Dallas and has been a train wreck on defense.

 

Hill isn't a traditional pick-and-roll point guard, someone who gets to the rim with lightning quickness or probes a defense in the style of Chris Paul or Steve Nash. The Pacers' offense, mediocre for the last two seasons even after the David West upgrade at power forward, could use a dash of that off-the-bounce creativity. Collison brought that off the bench and thrived in New Orleans, but he was never a reliable floor general. D.J. Augustin, Collison's de facto replacement, has been bad on both ends.

 

But Hill's more conservative style fits nicely within Indiana's "smashmouth" basketball vision. He's a solid entry passer, in part because he's very tall, and that allows him to find Roy Hibbert and West both on the block for post-ups and as they slip into the paint on pick-and-rolls, like this:5

 

 

That's a way of penetrating via the pass instead of the dribble, and Hill orchestrates this action well. He's also emerged as a solid 3-point shooter from all over the floor,6 a key component for any team whose post players can draw double-teams. That kind of range also keeps Hill valuable even when he doesn't have the ball, allowing George and Stephenson to handle it without compromising the offense.

 

And Hill's size is a huge asset defensively. Smaller point guards become more serious liabilities in the playoffs, when teams attack any size mismatch they can find until an opponent adjusts. The Pacers don't have to worry about that with Hill, who might be even better defending shooting guards when the Pacers shift him there; he's dynamite at chasing shooters around screens, and Indiana has used him during these playoffs as something of a stopper against Kyle Korver and Ray Allen.7

 

And yet: Both the imagined and actual reality tilt the scales in favor of San Antonio. For one, Leonard is already a very good NBA player earning nearly $11 million less than Hill over the next two seasons, before Leonard's next contract kicks in. He became a viable corner 3-point shooter almost overnight, executing a plan the Spurs hatched for him even before he became a Spur. San Antonio had only a few days to meet with Leonard between the draft and the lockout, and it used that time to have him work with its developmental staff, including Chad Forcier and Chip Engelland, the team's famed shot doctor. Leonard left with a written plan to rework his jumper by bringing the ball lower, level with his face, in the early part of his shooting motion, so that his release point would be above his head, he says. They were confident Leonard would stick to the plan, given everything they had heard about his work ethic, Buford says.

 

"It was just about reppin' that out," Leonard says of the plan, "and training my mind so that I could shoot like that without thinking."

 

He shot 47 percent from the corners as a rookie, but on only 49 attempts. He jacked 121 corner 3s this season and stayed accurate, hitting 43 percent, per NBA.com. He still struggles on non-corner 3s, but Leonard has gradually shown more individual creativity on offense this season. When defenders close out hard on him, Leonard can dribble by them, and either attack the rim or loft a nifty floater over a help defender. He's flashed hints of a post-up game, shooting 19-of-27 from the block this season after hitting just one such basket in all of 2011-12, per Synergy Sports.8 Most of those attempts have come in mismatches against smaller defenders, but Leonard has a bunch of crafty moves — a righty jump hook he can shoot from either block (i.e., going middle from the left block, and using a baseline drop-step from the right block), and a solid midrange turnaround he can attempt going over either shoulder. The post game isn't quite a weapon yet, but it probably will become one, and the Spurs will eventually be able to run those snug pick-and-rolls from the block with Leonard.

 

By any measure, Leonard snagged a larger role in San Antonio's humming offense this season. He logged more time, shot more often per minute, and got to the line more. Data from motion-tracking cameras installed in the Spurs' arena and 14 others shows Leonard dribbled the ball 51 times per game this season on average, up from 26 bounces per game as a rookie, and touched the rock 14 more times per game, according to STATS LLC, which runs the cameras.

 

But in the short run, the Spurs got Leonard for his defense. The 2010-11 Spurs were either shaky or small on the wing, a no-no for any team interested in competing with Kevin Durant or the new Heat. Those Spurs started a declining Jefferson at small forward, and when Jefferson rested, they usually went with a smaller three-guard set in which Manu Ginobili effectively played small forward. San Antonio understood that would not cut it. The Spurs thought Leonard might be the answer, but it was unclear if he'd develop into that answer before age chipped too much away from Tim Duncan, Ginobili, and Parker for the team to contend as Leonard rose up.

 

Man, has he done it. "He has exceeded our vision," Buford says. "I mean, we were hopeful, but you never anticipate you're going to bring someone in and have him fit right away with our group." Leonard isn't a flawless defender. When he's not involved in a play, he can sometimes space out watching the ball, even turning his back completely to his man, giving smart shooters a chance to drift away from him and into open space — as Klay Thompson does here in the left corner:

 

 

Clever players can hurt him with backdoor cuts, and teams can occasionally catch Leonard over-helping in the paint, even from the strongside corner, when nothing really threatening is going on inside. He'll miss a perimeter rotation here and there.

 

But some of that over-helping likely comes within the Spurs' general scheme. Leonard already shows a sophisticated understanding of which shooters he should respect and which allow for some creeping toward the middle. That sounds simple, but for young players, it's often quite difficult. "Most everybody can sit on the sideline and be pretty precise about it," New Orleans coach Monty Williams told me earlier this season about knowing personnel, "but when you're out there chasing around guys like Ray Allen and the great shooters in the league, it's different. And some of these young guys have never, ever, ever played against this caliber of shooter."

 

Leonard's footwork and timing are elite already, at least when he's operating at peak awareness. He's an expert at sniffing out the moment when he should recover to an outside shooter, and when a pass is in the air heading toward that shooter, it's remarkable how much ground Leonard can cover before the catch. Watch a reel of Leonard dealing with spot-up shooters, and you'll mostly see those shooters starting their shooting motion only to realize midway through, Oh, crap, this large man with giant arms and hands is coming at me, and he's going to block this shot or make me loft it so high it will look like an Al-Farouq Aminu prayer. Leonard forces those guys to put the ball on the floor and dribble themselves into tough 2-point shots — tricky runners Leonard can often challenge from behind because his nimble feet allow him to stop, change direction, and recover faster than most guys.

 

Leonard is both steady and fast-twitchy at once, a rare combination. He keeps his balance when recovering out to shooters at high speed, a skill several perimeter players have told me is the single hardest aspect of defense the NBA offers. He slithers and fights through screens on and off the ball, which is why Popovich trusted him to defend Mike Conley for key portions of San Antonio's Game 3 win in Memphis on Saturday.

 

In other words: It's hard to see the Spurs where they are now, seeking a fifth title in the Duncan era, without the emergence of Leonard.9 The Spurs with Leonard have a higher ceiling than the Spurs with both Hill and Parker.

 

The same isn't quite as true for the Pacers, both today and going forward. They're probably better off as is, considering the gap between Hill and Collison, but a starting five of Collison-George-Leonard-West-Hibbert would have been a two-way force that might match up a bit better, with Danny Granger out, against Miami's Dwyane Wade–LeBron James pairing. These Pacers could have run out Stephenson for a few minutes in Collison's place, featuring a feisty and huge wing trio. Turnovers likely would have been an issue, but the Pacers already have the second-worst turnover rate.

 

The cap implications, past and present, are also more thorny from Indiana's perspective. Hill has lived up so far to his five-year, $40 million deal, but he's already 27; Leonard is only 21 and has two years left on his rookie contract. Donnie Walsh, the Pacers' current president of basketball operations, said the team knew there would be competition for Hill last summer, when Hill was a restricted free agent, and sought to quash that competition by offering both a fifth year and going up to $40 million total. "I knew signing him to that number, we would not be susceptible to counteroffers from other teams," says Walsh, who adds that the negotiations were fairly easy.

 

But something funky happened with Indiana's cap management during the early days of free agency last summer, before Hill and Hibbert signed their new contracts. With common-sense decisions on cap holds, the Pacers could have had about $10.5 million in space that would expire the minute those two signed their new deals; they had a window in which they could operate under the cap via that space.10 Indiana needed a backup center, and instead of signing Ian Mahinmi, an unrestricted free agent, they traded Collison and Dahntay Jones for Mahinmi in a sign-and-trade. Coming to a quick agreement with Hill obviously made Collison expendable, and he became the bait for Dallas swallowing Jones's $2.9 million player option. Collison would have been essential had the Pacers feared Hill walking away.

 

It's still unclear why Indiana went that route. The Pacers wanted Mahinmi (or some other affordable big) and Gerald Green, also a free agent, and signing both players while keeping both Collison and Jones would have taken Indiana dangerously close to the tax line once the Hibbert and Hill deals kicked in. "We have an internal budget," Walsh says, "and we didn't want to go into the tax." But signing Green and then D.J. Augustin, the latter as Collison's replacement, to $7 million combined (along with Mahinmi) ended up costing only about $1.7 million less than the Collison-Jones-Green-Mahinmi quartet earned together. Avoiding Green altogether, signing Mahinmi outright, and simply keeping Jones and Collison would have been cheaper than both options.11

 

Sussing out the timing of all these transactions can be tricky, but the Hill contract played at least a small role in sending Indiana down a rabbit hole of moves that failed in the end to upgrade Indiana's paper-thin bench. Mahinmi has been useful, but when you're playing Sam Young key postseason minutes, you need another wing body.

 

The Pacers' salary situation is also tighter than it might otherwise be going forward as they prep again to upgrade that bench. West's cap hold vaporizes all their potential cap room this summer, and a new two-year deal for West, plus the max salary coming up for George,12 would probably keep Indiana capped out — or close to it — until after the 2014-15 season.

 

That's not a terrible thing. This team is already very good, with room to grow, and their cap sheet even with these West and George deals will be clean enough (in the worst case) for them to use the full midlevel exception, engage in sign-and-trades, etc. Things would be easier with Leonard on a rookie deal instead of Hill at $8 million, but Hill is a talented player whose status as a local hero and devoted community servant has helped the Pacers rebuild their bond with Indianapolis.

 

Another thing that has helped repair that bond: a trip to the conference finals, and a spirited battle there with the favored and glamorous Heat. Even if the Spurs and Pacers aren't "winners" in an equal sense, the trade has worked out fine for Indiana in the big picture; it's as if it got to choose between two very delicious slices of pie. The Pacers got the slightly less delicious slice.

 

And in the short run, it's unclear if either of these teams would be in the conference finals without this deal. This trade received nothing like the attention of the Rudy Gay deal. But less than two years later, it's done far more to affect the championship-level landscape of the NBA.

 

Fonte: Espn / http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/9316310/analyzing-kawhi-leonard-george-hill-trade-2013-conference-finals

Editado 8 Junho 2013 por Snoop Dogg

[Carson Wentz]

Põe a fonte, bicho.

[andriy pereplyotkin]

Stanford student gaining cult status for rethinking NBA philosophy

 

By Daniel Brown

 

 

PALO ALTO -- Muthu Alagappan arrived at Stanford University with his heart set on attending medical school, and he still hopes to become a doctor someday.

 

Revolutionizing the NBA is just his hobby.

 

Somehow, though, goofing around with basketball stats after work one day led to a discovery that has made Alagappan, 23, a cult figure in the growing field of sports analytics. "If Moneyball revolutionized baseball," GQ Magazine wrote, 'Muthuball' could mark a new frontier for the NBA."

 

Two years ago, Alagappan was an intern at Ayasdi, a Palo Alto-based startup company, using the company's proprietary software to tackle complex problems such as cancer research and accelerated drug discovery.

 

On a lark, he asked his boss if he could see what the software would do with basketball stats. Within an hour, the program spit out clusters of color-coded notes that Alagappan now calls "the true positions of the NBA."

 

His discovery has opened up a whole new basketball debate -- a Pandora's box-and-one, if you will. Alagappan argues that basketball's traditional five positions are as outmoded as James Naismith's peach basket, insisting instead that there are at least 10 distinct positions.

 

And he has the topological data analysis to prove it.

 

"The positions are kind of the alphabet by which everything around basketball revolves," Alagappan said. "If we can redefine the alphabet in terms of these 10 or 13 positions, then we can hopefully

change all of the strategy that the game is built on."

 

Alagappan first proposed his discovery at MIT's Sloan Sports Analytics Conference in 2012. The presentation captured first prize, as well as the attention of NBA executives and the national media.

 

Forbes magazine selected Alagappan to its "30 Under 30" list of influential sports industry figures last year, putting him with LeBron James, Usain Bolt and Sidney Crosby. Alagappan's work has also been dissected in The New York Times, ESPN, The Wall Street Journal, Wired and (in a negative review) Slate.

 

Two NBA teams have secured a formal partnership to hear more: the defending champion Miami Heat and the Portland Trail Blazers. During these playoffs, a representative from the Heat checks in with Alagappan before each series to help compile a data-oriented scouting report.

 

Beyond the box score

 

 

The Warriors have no official partnership with Alagappan, but Golden State's assistant general manager, Kirk Lacob, has had dinner with his fellow Stanford grad to hear the kid out.

 

"It's interesting because I think it caught a lot of people off guard when he first presented this idea," Lacob said, referring to the MIT conference.

 

"But Muthu really went an extra mile and proved what a lot of people were starting to think. He put it down on paper more succinctly and more exactly what people were thinking while others were just throwing things at the wall.

 

"I don't really know how much stock NBA teams have put in it, but certainly it's another example of where basketball -- and sports in general -- have gotten in analytics. They're starting to look at things past the regular box score. It's a cool time to be in sports."

 

Alagappan is hardly the first person to crunch the numbers in basketball. Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey, most notably, is an MIT MBA who grew up reading Bill James' "Baseball Abstracts" before becoming one of the first NBA executives to value analytics. Alagappan is proud to point out that Morey's former executive vice president of basketball operations, Sam Hinkie, earned his MBA from Stanford.

 

Hinkie left Houston to take over as the general manager of the Philadelphia 76ers.

 

Other scientific-minded hoops writers, such as Ken Pomeroy of kenpom.com, have opened new portals of debate. Alagappan is just trying to hasten the evolution.

 

Scheming with precision

 

During a recent meeting at the Ayasdi offices in Palo Alto, just before he headed off to class, Alagappan sat down to lay out his vision for the NBA future. Armed with slides and a methodical, academic presentation, his message was essentially the same one he delivered MIT, as well as subsequent speaking gigs at South by Southwest and the TedX in Spokane, Wash.

 

Alagappan likes to open with a parable about medicine, noting that almost 2,000 years ago the Roman physician Galen theorized that all illnesses could be classified under one of four bodily fluids. As science evolved, doctors grew to understand that diseases and their cures were much more complex.

 

And so it is now with basketball, Alagappan says, arguing that the oversimplified constructs of point guard, shooting guard, small forward, power forward and center should be replaced by a more sophisticated list of positions as varied as "low-usage ballhandlers," such as Trevor Ariza and Courtney Lee, to "midrange big men" such as Brandon Bass and Glen Davis.

 

Even youth league coaches know that the traditional positions are just rough sketches and that, say, some point guards are pass-first while some are eager shooters. But Alagappan says Ayasdi's software offers a chance to identify precise or even undetected differences, and to therefore scheme with more precision.

 

Founded in 2008 by Stanford academics, Ayasdi makes sense of complicated data sets by arranging them in shapes, using topology. Gunnar Carlsson, a Stanford mathematics professor and company co-founder, explained to The Wall Street Journal earlier this year that topology helps researchers look at a set of data and think about its similarities, even when some of the underlying details might be different.

 

Understanding the blend

 

To demonstrate how topology can apply to hoops, Alagappan puts up a slide showing the topological networks of two contrasting NBA teams from the 2010-11 season. This is from his original MIT presentation before he had whittled his proposed 13 positions down to its current 10.

 

Both graphics connect every player on the roster with lines. Dense groups form clusters wherever players have similar statistical profiles.

 

The slide showing Team A was a visually balanced concoction of "scoring rebounders," two "paint protectors" and a variety of ballhandlers with complimentary skills. This was the NBA champion Dallas Mavericks

 

Team B was a lopsided mess with a preponderance of ballhandlers but zero scoring rebounders. GQ once described this graphic as looking "wrong, like a car with three wheels about to tip over." This graphic represented the last-place Minnesota Timberwolves.

 

General managers who better understand the blend might have a better chance of creating what now is loosely defined as "chemistry."

 

"We're trying to develop new ways of playing basketball that have never been tried before," Alagappan said. "We might not be Hall-of-Fame coaches, but we're using software that's really, really intelligent. It can predict things that you might be able to try."

 

Alagappan resists trying to explain the Warriors' playoff success, warning that the sample size is too small. But asked to explain how the team could withstand the loss of All-Star power forward David Lee, he speculated that giving the bulk of Lee's minutes to small forward Draymond Green, a 3-point shooting threat, might have opened up the floor and allowed the Warriors to capitalize on penetration and ball movement.

 

Lee, he said, would be classified as a "scoring rebounder," a position the Warriors already had in abundance with Andrew Bogut and Carl Landry. As Alagappan wrote in an email: "Thus, a combination of spreading the floor, increasing shot selection versatility, and reducing positional redundancy are likely reasons for the Warriors improved play."

 

'Going to get pushback'

 

Not everyone is impressed. Alagappan's critics argue that most coaches -- from the youth league on up -- already understand that basketball's current five positions are merely rough sketches of skill sets. Former Warriors coach Don Nelson, to name one, earned a spot in the Hall of Fame with an innovative approach to positions; he was known to unleash a lineup of small, quick players to torment a plodding opponent -- traditional definitions be damned.

 

Slate, sizing up Alagappan's list of proposed positions, concluded that there was nothing new, at least in terms of concepts: "NBA teams already approach the question of positions with greater nuance than the box score does. General managers look for defensive-minded bigs, volume scorers, wing defenders and other player-types that are not listed in the box score."

 

Alagappan, a fan of the data-driven "Moneyball" philosophy that has kept the A's a small-payroll contender, said he expected to hear from critics.

 

"Any time you're putting out a new idea that either challenges the existing paradigm or threatens people currently doing a job because of the current paradigm, you're going to get a lot of pushback," he said. "We've actually been lucky in that it hasn't been that bad."

 

Alagappan said that his data's value is in quantifying what, for lesser coaches, had merely been a hunch. Moreover, he said, clarifying what a player brings to the court can help front offices put together more efficient rosters as well as identify undervalued players.

 

"Some coaches -- obviously the best ones -- get paid to do this and (Gregg) Popovich and a lot of the best coaches are doing this kind of analysis in their head," Alagappan said.

 

"But the limits of the human brain exist. With this technology, we can do what the best coaches have been doing in their minds for years and kind of give that to everyone, not just the Popoviches and the Phil Jacksons of the world."

 

Follow Daniel Brown on Twitter at @mercbrownie.

 

Repositioning the court

 

Here are three of the 10 positions Muthu Alagappan believes make the most sense for today's basketball:

 

Jump shooting ballhandler

Handles the ball while being a focal point of the offense through deadly jump shooting

 

Protype: Stephen Curry, Warriors

 

Two-way All-Star

Elite offensive and defensive player, who can dominate the game on both ends of the court

 

Prototype: Kobe Bryant, Lakers

 

3-point

ballhandler

Ballhandler who features an offensive arsenal highlighted by 3-point shooting

 

Prototype:

Klay Thompson,

Warriors

 

 

Fonte

[Osnofa]

muitas dessas "posições" já são mencionadas mas é sempre interessante ver dados a favor e um modelo que possa ajudar a melhorar as equipas.

[LgD]

Exacto, e tendo em conta que os pontos, ressaltos e etc que os jogadores conseguiram e que foram usados para este estudo vieram das suas 5 posições mas gostei de ler

[Carson Wentz]

Familiar faces among the remaining 2013 free agents

Satchel Price - SB Nation

 

Most of the good players have already been signed, but you'll know the names on this list of remaining free agents.

 

With most contracts already signed and NBA rosters nearing their limits, pickings are increasingly slim on the free agent market. Fans might be surprised by the number of they're familiar with that are still available, though, even though NBA teams have decided to pass on them for reasons other than their name value.

 

We've compiled the most notable remaining free agents, ranging from guys hoping for a second chance to former All-Stars seeking a final taste of the NBA life. Some of these guys could end up contributing to NBA rosters this season, but just as many could end up overseas or retired.

 

Here's a list of notable players with five-plus years of NBA experience still on the market.

 

Leandro Barbosa: Injuries ended last season for Barbosa, but he can still be a useful scorer off the bench when healthy. No longer able to penetrate defenses like before, the Brazilian guard still brings above-average shooting to the table and he's just 30 years old. Assuming he can get healthy, Barbosa could be an intriguing addition for somebody.

 

Raja Bell: After sitting out the 2012-13 season despite spending most of it under contract with Utah, Bell could earn some interest given his skill set. Not quite as athletic as he once was, the 36-year-old still displayed solid shooting touch last time he took the court and always works on defense. He's a classic 3-and-D wing.

 

Marquis Daniels: The past couple seasons have robbed Daniels of the athleticism that made him a somewhat efficient scorer earlier in his career, but he continued to earn playing time with the Bucks in 2012-13 thanks to his defense. We'll see if that happens somewhere again this season.

 

Daniel Gibson: Once a key sidekick for LeBron James in Cleveland, Gibson struggled to expand his game when the world's best player headed to Miami. An excellent three-point shooter, he's knocked down 41 percent of his career attempts from beyond the arc ... but doesn't do much else.

 

Drew Gooden: Just three years ago, the Bucks gave Gooden a five-year, $32 million contract only to quickly regret the ill-advised decision. Milwaukee finally cut bait with the forward last month after getting just 107 games played in the past three seasons and he became an unrestricted free agent after clearing waivers. Not too long ago, the 31-year-old was a decent post scorer and rebounder so he'll probably find a deal -- even after a season full of DNP-CDs.

 

Richard Hamilton: After falling out of favor with Bulls coach Tom Thibodeau last season, Hamilton finds himself a free agent this summer. He tweeted last month that he had multiple options to continue his career, but there haven't been many reports about the 35-year-old. No longer the savvy scorer that made Hamilton a three-time All-Star, he'll have to convince teams his shooting can rebound after a shaky season.

 

Al Harrington: Since clearing waivers after being released by Orlando last month, we haven't heard much about Harrington. He could help a number of teams looking for a Stretch 4, though. He was a top reserve for the Nuggets in 2011-12 while averaging 14.4 points per game and could provide fill a similar role next season if he's past the injuries.

 

Dahntay Jones: After splitting the 2012-13 season between Dallas and Atlanta, Jones hasn't garnered much interest this summer. He's still a rugged defender, but his mediocre rebounding, passing and shooting skills haven't gotten better with age.

 

Corey Maggette: Maggette was supposed to fill a mentoring role with the Pistons last season, but that doesn't overshadow his struggles on the court. Detroit is surely done with the 33-year-old after adding Josh Smith, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope and Luigi Datome this offseason so this could spell the end for a player who averaged 20 points per game from 2004-10.

 

Tracy McGrady: One of the most electrifying players of his generation, McGrady narrowly missed out on getting his first ring last season with the San Antonio Spurs. Now a fringe player with declining skills, the 34-year-old could head back to China next season -- a place where he's massively popular from his days starring with the Yao Ming-led Rockets.

 

Lamar Odom: Ever since being dealt from the Lakers in 2011, Odom has seen his career deteriorate to unimaginable proportions. One of the most versatile players in the league during his peak in Los Angeles, Odom worked his way into a reserve role with the Clippers last season but never showed the ability that made him Sixth Man of the Year two years ago. We'll see if some team banks on the 33-year-old's return to form.

 

Vladimir Radmanovic: If the sweet-shooting big man is going to get another gig next season, he'll have to show he hasn't lost his touch. A highly efficient long range shooter throughout his career, Radmanovic shot just 5-of-27 (18 percent) from three-point range in limited action with the Chicago Bulls in 2012-13.

 

Jerry Stackhouse: It's easy to forget that Stackhouse led the NBA in scoring during the 2000-01 season, but he was quite the volume scorer once upon a time. Now simply a long body that can hit the occasional three and knocks down free-throws at a high rate, here's where we'll point out his 9.6 PER over the past five years.

 

Tyrus Thomas: Considering his career arc, it's crazy to remember that Thomas is just 26 years old. Once seemingly on his way to becoming an elite defender to the extent that Charlotte gave him $40 million, his downfall over the past three years has been as stark as any in the league. Now a free agent after being amnestied by the Bobcats, he's received interest from the Knicks ... but most teams seem to have recognized he won't reach his potential.

 

Jamaal Tinsley: The longtime starting point guard for the Pacers spent last season in a surprisingly large role with the Jazz. Unfortunately he shot below 40 percent from the field for the fourth time in five seasons, though, so he leaves a lot to be desired.

[Pat Riley]

O Gibson dava jeito para sup do Chalmers, mas não há cap :(

[Hugo Jr.]

Muita gente interessante ainda sem equipa. E por favor alguém ofereça um contrato ao Stackhouse :mrgreen:

[LgD]

Quero que roubemos alguém daí da lista com o Vet. Min, LETS GO GARPAX, Nate 2.0

[Pat Riley]

Tou sem tempo para copiar isto tudo para aqui mas leiam no site:

http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1829960-the-unofficial-2013-nba-player-census-visualized?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=programming-national

[Hugo Jr.]

Muito interessante.

[andriy pereplyotkin]

 

Suns proving surprisingly adept at team defense

RANDY HILL | Published: Tuesday, November 12, 2013, 12:08pm

 

 

PHOENIX -- Having flummoxed NBA soothsayers through seven fun-filled evenings, the Suns seem committed to the game-winning properties of string music.

 

The string we’re referencing is not the one attached to a rim; instead it's an imaginary implement connecting Phoenix defenders, who just happen to be performing at rare levels of competence.

 

For contextual input on this defensive evolution, let’s take a moment with highly qualified Suns forward P.J. Tucker.

 

“Mike has everybody on a string,” said Tucker, the team’s defensive anchor since returning from Euro-style exile last season. “Everybody knows where they’re supposed to be in each situation.”

 

“Mike,” by the way, is first-year assistant coach Mike Longabardi, who followed in the footsteps of Tom Thibodeau as a Boston Celtics’ defensive-oriented mastermind.

 

Anyway, this knowing of where to be seems about as anathema to historical Phoenix protocols as a snow plow.

 

The string Tucker refers to ties all five defenders together. And when the ball moves and/or an offensive player moves, simultaneous movement of one Suns defender creates movement of the other four. (There’s also early movement, and we’ll have more on that in a jiffy.)

 

Anyway, it’s a concept known among dreamy-eyed coaches as five against the ball -- whereby individual, on-ball defense is abetted by total team buy-in to preventing the opposition from scoring so stinking often.

 

Through an impressive grasping of Longabardi’s philosophical approach -- a ball-pressuring, floor-shrinking, lane-clogging and early-helping system -- the Suns have risen to sixth among NBA teams for defensive efficiency (points allowed per 100 possessions). They checking in at 23rd last season. For the record, the efficiency number sits at 99.5; it was an alarming 108.1 during the final stretch with Alvin Gentry and the cameo from Lindsay Hunter.

 

Beyond any schematic upgrades, however, getting better on defense requires a coaching staff to make it a point of emphasis in camp and enforce the articles of accountability as the season progresses.

 

Check.

 

“When you mess up, he knows,” Tucker said of Longabardi. “He’s going to be on you … from top to bottom, no matter who it is.”

 

Even when you’re the guy designated to smother some of the league’s top offensive hotshots?

 

“He gets on me,” Tucker said. “I mess up, I’m in the wrong spot sometimes … but I love it. It keeps me in check.”

 

Keeping offenses in check is the first stage in the Suns’ quest to reset a typical Phoenix tempo and generate enough superstar-free offense to compete with the league’s powerhouses.

 

The Suns currently sit in first place for fast-break points per game (23.2), which is a salty 10 more than they managed last season. And even though Coach Jeff Hornacek wants the pace pushed in the less-frequent aftermath of an opponents’ bucket, that fast-break number is goosed to current levels by forcing tougher shots and turnovers before finishing with a defensive rebound.

 

Although the Suns aren’t great in these areas yet, they are better (with the exception of forcing turnovers) than in recent memory. Through seven games, Phoenix is eighth in blocked shots, 16th in turnovers forced (they were 7th last season … gambling and losing?) and a heady sixth in opposition field-goal percentage.

 

And by the way, their ranking of eighth in 3-point percentage defense puts the Suns 22 spots ahead of where the finished last season.

 

With Longabardi’s interpretation of a defensive philosophy originally known as Pack-line (now-retired college coach Dick Bennett is credited with its popularity), the lane area is sacrosanct.

 

That’s not exactly a shockingly creative theory, of course. Accomplishing this wall-building requires awareness and accountability in the task of helping or cheating over early into help areas.

 

“That’s what he’s been emphasizing since training camp … early help, getting over early,” Suns guard Goran Dragic said of Longabardi. “He’s very smart.”

 

And when the no-fly-zone is breeched, it also helps to have a big, bouncy and wise dude on the back line of the Pack-line. That dude is newcomer Miles Plumlee, who currently is tied for fifth place in the league for blocks per game (2.3).

 

“Even when he doesn’t get ’em, they’re big for us because he alters shots and he’s very smart about not following through -- he’s not trying to bat ’em into the stands," Hornacek said.

 

“He’s just getting his hands on the ball. That’s huge for us, for him to protect the rim like that.”

 

It’s also pretty important for players involved in that five-against-the-ball approach to understand how to help the helper who helped the helper who … well, just being committed to stopping a team instead of a particular player (unless you’re on the ball) makes this thing work.

 

So far, the Suns are displaying keen awareness.

 

“For the most part, they’re good at it,” Hornacek said. “We do it every day in practice, we really focus on that.”

 

When asked for his interpretation of the difference in defensive focus from last season to this season, Tucker didn’t hesitate.

 

“Black and white,” he said.

 

Perhaps he meant night and day.

 

Or P.J. might have been referring to how this focus has translated to the black and white of a statistical sheet … or the division standings.

 

“For a young team just getting together,” Hornacek said, “they’re doing the right things.”

[Carson Wentz]

A Sixers asset no one is talking about

fortisanima - Liberty Ballers

 

 

Coming into the season the general consensus was that the Sixers are building for the future. Nothing 15 games in has changed any of this, so it is time to look at the assets that the Sixers have. The Sixers have four realistic assets this trade season: Turner, Hawes, Thad, and cap space. Though I think the value of the first three have been discussed heavily in this blog and other news outlets, I will discuss the value of the Sixers cap space (and one possible trade) that can really improve the Sixers' long-term outlook.

 

The current salary cap is 58.7M with the luxury tax threshold set at 71.7M. What this means is that you can sign any free agent, take back as much money as you want in trades, basically do anything you wish as long as your salary is below 58.7M. Above 58.7M you are more restricted in what you can do, for example you can't take a large contract without giving up at least 66% of the salary back to the team you are trading with and you can't sign free agents. Above 71.7M you are in the luxury tax meaning you pay a lot of money to the rest of the league and pay even more if you stay in the tax multiple times (repeater tax).

 

So heading into the middle of the year the Sixers salary currently stands around 45.4M. To put this in perspective the next lowest team is Phoenix at 53.2M. This means the Sixers are able to take back 13M in salary without giving anyone back!. Why this matters is that there are a number of teams above the tax but could have incentive to go below the tax. The teams over are:

 

• Brooklyn - 29.5M over
  
• New York - 15.1M over
  
• Miami - 12.3M over
  
• Chicago - 10.2M over
  
• Lakers - 7.9 over
  
• Clippers/Toronto - 2M or less over

 

Looking at this list there are two teams with the most to gain with a sizable salary dump. Obviously Brooklyn and New York are way over the cap, and with their teams having no assets to speak of there really is no trade that makes sense with those teams. Miami has all their salary tied up in three players you may have heard of, so no value in trading with them. The Clippers and Toronto are barely over the cap and thus they can trade with anyone so the Sixers have minimal leverage. Only Chicago and the Lakers seem like really good trade partners (only we have the full cap space to bring them under the cap), and though each could be a fit I will focus on Chicago (though depending on medical reasons trading Steve Nash to the Sixers could be a very good fit and is probably Hinkie's backup plan).

 

Chicago is currently 10.2M over the cap. What this means is that they will pay 16.75M in luxury tax this year if nothing changes. The rules governing the repeater penalty are complex, but basically for each dollar they go over the cap the second year they pay the equivalent amount extra. So if they go 10M over the cap again next year, they will pay 10M more for having gone over the cap this year. Lastly they will not get the payout this year that goes with going under the cap (about half of the money that goes into cap divided by teams not in it). Given the ridiculous amount that the Nets will pay into the cap the total each team will get shared is around 3M dollars. So if Chicago sent 10M in salary to the Sixers they would save - (16.75M luxury tax + 10M they are sending + 3M they get from being under luxury + 10M they don't pay in repeater next year assuming they go into luxury tax to the same amount to sign good free agents) or around 40M dollars.

 

When we look at Chicago's team it could make even more sense to work out a trade. A lot of talk has been around how Chicago should trade Deng this year since he has an expiring contract. Well since Deng makes 14.3M no team can trade with Chicago (other than the Sixers) without having to give back about 9M in salary. Now granted Chicago can work out a number of different trades to try and get under the tax (retrade that 9M for 6M, retrade the 6M for 3M), but unless they execute a cost cutting strategy with many separate trades they really cannot get under the luxury tax without trading with the Sixers.

 

What makes the situation even more appealing for a trade is that Carlos Boozer is a likely amnesty candidate next year for Chicago. He stands to make 16.8M dollars and is probably worth around half of that, and given the fact that the Bulls have a stud waiting in Europe that is a power forward Boozer is almost certainly going to be amnestied (paid by the Bulls not to play for them).

 

The bottom line here is that the Sixers (and really only the Sixers) could save the Bulls a whole lot of money. If the Sixers executed a simple trade - Turner for Boozer - and the Bulls do a few smaller moves to bring them under the cap it would save the Bulls the 40M above as well as 17M in Boozer's salary next year in that the Bulls would no longer have to amnesty him. In other words, a Turner for Boozer trade would save the Bulls around 57M dollars between this year and next. 57 fucking million dollars. And it would give the Bulls a guy that can actual handle the ball and make shots instead of forcing their fans to watch the dreadful offense that we've seen from them up to this point with Rose out (plus Turner is a Chicago native). They also have another PF (Taj Gibson) that could take more minutes this year and help replace some of Boozer's production.

 

To be clear from the Sixers side we would need a lot of assets to trade for Turner for Boozer. With the cap space for draft picks market being set by the Utah Jazz/Golden State trade I would state that it would probably take roughly the equivalent of three first rounders to make this trade reasonable for the Sixers given that we are giving up two assets (Turner and cap space) and taking a salary dump (Boozer). Since I can't see Chicago giving up three future first rounders to make this trade work, I'll go with a different approach that drops another million or so from Chicago in place of a pick to get them right in line with the cap.

 

Chicago trades

 

Rights to Charlotte first round pick (top 10 protected)

 

Carlos Boozer

 

Tony Snell (20th pick past draft - (equal of a draft pick)

 

Chicago 2014 or 2015 first round pick

 

Philadelphia trades

 

Evan Turner

 

This leaves Chicago right at the cap and thus saving 57M dollars. From the Sixers side they get three first rounders (Tony Snell, the Bulls 2014 and Charlotte's) but give up Turner and take on the contract that is Boozer's for two years. The only problem is that Boozer has value and would hurt the tanking but tough to argue with that haul even if it does kill the cap room for next year (where we wouldn't sign anyone of value anyway... think 2015 for when cap space might matter for a free agent). I think a win-win.

 

Muito interessante, muito mesmo. Quatro coisas sobre isto:

 

• Não sei qual a direcção que os Bulls vão pretender tomar, daí não saber até que ponto aquelas picks de 2014/15 são trocáveis para Chicago/apelativas para Philly;
   
  
• Entre amnesty no Boozer por nada ou pelo Turner parece-me que não há dúvidas (e voltamos à questão das picks, porque o Snell seria redundante);
   
  
• Com isto, a possibilidade de trabalharem cenários de trades com o Deng fica muito mais aberta.
   
  
• Sinto-me quase como tendo um bacharelato em economia ao perceber e reconhecer as clauses e as regras financeiras aí metidas ao barulho! :lol:

[Jonas F]

Rose e TUrner na mesma equipa, seria giro :lol:

[Carson Wentz]

True that. :mrgreen:

[Bynum Lover]

Porque é que os Sixers iriam trocar o Turner por 1 mid-round pick, uma late 1st round pick e o Snell, que não conheço mas suponho que não venha a ser mais que um role player?

[Carson Wentz]

Porque é que os Sixers iriam trocar o Turner por 1 mid-round pick, uma late 1st round pick e o Snell, que não conheço mas suponho que não venha a ser mais que um role player?

 

Porque o Turner aqui não vai dar em nada e seriam duas picks + o Snell, neste draft principalmente é de aproveitar. E mesmo sem ser neste draft, normalmente temos mais sorte com as picks mais tardias (o ET foi a 2ª, mas o Iggy foi 9ª, Jrue 11ª, Thad 16ª ou 17ª não me recordo ao certo). E ainda para mais é o Hinkie o GM (Parsons ring a bell?)

[andriy pereplyotkin]

As picks nem sempre têm que ser usadas, podem servir para facilitar negócios. No negócio com os Clips e os Bucks os Suns mandaram o Dudley para LA e uma 2nd rounder que foram buscar aos Lakers (Nash) para Milwaukee.

[Bynum Lover]

Esclarecido, mas acredito que conseguissem algo melhor, não têm razão para panicar e podem esperar por um negócio melhor, que costuma aparecer mais perto da deadline, onde jogadores como o ET podem dar aquele boost necessário para uma equipa de PO chegar mais longe.

[Pat Riley]

Esclarecido, mas acredito que conseguissem algo melhor, não têm razão para panicar e podem esperar por um negócio melhor, que costuma aparecer mais perto da deadline, onde jogadores como o ET podem dar aquele boost necessário para uma equipa de PO chegar mais longe.

 

A existir uma troca dessas o ET era gajo para chokar forte e feio.

[Carson Wentz]

Esclarecido, mas acredito que conseguissem algo melhor, não têm razão para panicar e podem esperar por um negócio melhor, que costuma aparecer mais perto da deadline, onde jogadores como o ET podem dar aquele boost necessário para uma equipa de PO chegar mais longe.

 

Acho que eles vão tentar trocar primeiro o Hawes. Mas também quanto mais perto da deadline menos vantagem temos para negociar e, mais que isso, mais vitórias ele nos deu.

[Bynum Lover]

A existir uma troca dessas o ET era gajo para chokar forte e feio.

Não digo que ele vá ser um go2guy ou coisa que o valha. E actualmente é muito complicado perspectivar quem vai aos PO que esta NBA tá de loucos. Mas assim de cabeça e se hoje fosse o deadline, Portland poderia querer um 6th man, Dallas poderia procurar o mesmo, OKC igual. É mais nesse sentido e o ET não me parece um mau jogador, acho que faz um pouco de tudo e numa equipa onde seja o 3º ou 4º melhor da equipa acho que pode evoluir bastante.

 

Acho que eles vão tentar trocar primeiro o Hawes. Mas também quanto mais perto da deadline menos vantagem temos para negociar e, mais que isso, mais vitórias ele nos deu.

Sim, também é verdade, até as picks ganham outra força porque as equipas já têm uma maior noção que range terá as picks que vão trocar e podem pensar 2x. E isso das vitórias, é difícil terem um roster pior, pode ser que o MCW apanhe uma lesão grave :mrgreen:

O Hawes é péssimo, a única cena boa que tem é ser expiring(salvo erro).

[Pat Riley]

O Hawes é péssimo? Mas tu tens visto NBA ou nem por isso?

[Bynum Lover]

O Hawes é péssimo? Mas tu tens visto NBA ou nem por isso?

Eu se tivesse nos Sixers fazia médias de double-double :mrgreen:

O Hawes é tipo um basher do ténis, é daqueles que em noite sim faz jogos do crl, lança de todo o lado para uma banheira. Mas num jogo intenso, em que cada momento atacante e defensivo é super importante e qualquer erro é aproveitado, ele é péssimo. Os Sixers estão sem pressão, estão a jogar de forma livre e ele tem espaço para fazer jogos melhores. Numa equipa ou num contexto diferente, dar-me-ás razão ;)