NBA - Artigos e Análises Estatísticas para discussão

[Carson Wentz]

Nesta concordo com o Bynum.

 

O que lhe dá vantagem é o lançamento exterior, ainda assim, o que é difícil encontrar num 7-footer ou perto disso (Dirk, Frye, Bargs, Ryan Anderson e mais quem?) e pode dar muito bom jeito num contender.

[Nuk]

Nesta concordo com o Bynum.

 

O que lhe dá vantagem é o lançamento exterior, ainda assim, o que é difícil encontrar num 7-footer ou perto disso (Dirk, Frye, Bargs, Ryan Anderson e mais quem?) e pode dar muito bom jeito num contender.

Ersan.

 

Concordo com o Bynum. Mas continuo a gostar do Hawesome :heart:

[Pat Riley]

Eu acho que o Hawes não é péssimo em equipa nenhuma da liga. Vejo-o numa equipa que luta pelo titulo a ser importante a fazer 15/20 minutos, mas com o contrato que tem, e com as deficiências torna-se dificil ir parar a alguma. Mais que isso não dá e nesta parte concordo com o Bynum, com pressão e quando todos lances defensivos/ofensivos contam, ele deixa de contribuir para prejudicar.

[Jonas F]

Bosh :mrgreen:

[Pat Riley]

O Bosh teve miseravel a nivel ofensivo mas a nivel defensivo foi importantissimo. No game 6 então...

[Perdigas]

Eu acho que o Hawes não é péssimo em equipa nenhuma da liga. Vejo-o numa equipa que luta pelo titulo a ser importante a fazer 15/20 minutos

Agora sou eu! Estava um português, um inglês e um francês..

 

 

:mrgreen:

[Pat Riley]

ide todos levar no rabinho

 

mandem-no para miami que eu não me importo

[andriy pereplyotkin]

Phoenix Suns using analytics to get the most out of their shots

By haremoor

 

 

The Phoenix Suns are enjoying unexpected success in a season where they abandoned the safety of their tank in favor of a swarming ground assault. Reminiscent of the 88-89 or 2009-10 Suns, they have surprised while remaining firmly under the radar. Why? Game plan. Execution. Teamwork. Strategery.

 

This is not an accident. As Thomas Jefferson said,

 

"I am a great believer in luck, and I find the harder I work, the more I have of it."

 

The Suns have earned this with hard work, hustle, and trust. Exactly the way McDonough drew it up. We are a good team - a very good team. But we aren't "there" yet. There are some things we need to do better, and many things we can (and will) do better.

 

The first thing that jumps out from the stat sheet is the improved play of Goran Dragic. Our leading scorer last year, he's increased his scoring by almost 5 points per game. A big reason for that is the improved outside shooting, fueled by the return of Channing Frye, the upgrade of Gerald Green instead of Shannon Brown and Wes Johnson, Marcus Morris in place of Beasley, and the massively improved shooting of PJ Tucker. But the across the board improvement in shooting can be explained, to a certain extent, by statistics.

 

New this year to the NBA fan is a limited look into the tracking of data from the innovative SportsVU cameras now hanging in every NBA arena. Originally possessed by just a few teams, (including the Suns) the NBA saw the value in the system and provided it everywhere. They even made some of the data available to the general public, although much of the data is still hidden behind the veil of secrecy maintained by front offices that have built entire departments to analyze and interpret the raw data as they see fit. The cameras can track distance travelled on a play or in a game, shots and rebounds that are open or contested, efficiency from different spots on the floor, how defense affects shooting - any number of things that aren't measured in a traditional box-score. Each team has access to mountains of raw data, and they aren't likely to let anyone know how they are crunching it, but even so, we can take the nuggets they toss us to draw some better conclusions than we have in the past.

 

One thing that most every fan of the NBA knows by now is that shooting threes - particularly the (shorter) corner three - is generally better than shooting long twos. This is something that Miami, San Antonio, and Houston most notably have adopted. The Suns have changed from the Gentry/Hunter strategy of "being aggressive, no matter where the shot is taken from" to Hornacek's more informed strategy of "shoot close or shoot far". To this point in the season, it's working - the Suns have cut their mid-range shots by 5%, increased their threes (and the three percentage) to the point where we are second in the association in threes attempted and made, and are 10th (and climbing) in 3FG%. We have cut down the less efficient long twos (partially by shipping off Beasley and Brown), Markeiff is playing and shooting closer to the basket, and having two attacking PG's and an effective center is getting us more looks at the rim.

 

Even more important, though, we are taking more open shots. There is not much statistical data available for the layman to work with, but a very good article called "Hand down, Man down" explains that there are seven different categories of shot defense that are being tracked by the author's company, CAC.. They are:

 

• 
   
  
• OPEN (no defender within 5 feet)
  
• GUARDED (defender within 3-5 feet)
  
• PRESSURED (defender within 3-5 feet, but no hand up)
  
• CONTESTED (defender within 3 feet and hand is up in front of the shooter)
  
• ALTERED (defender within 3 feet, hand is up, and shooter is forced to change shooting angle or release point)
  
• BLOCK (defender blocks shot)
  
• FOUL (defender fouls shooter)
   
  

 

 

As you can see, closer is better, open is better than contested, and that the progression is logical.

 

What the chart doesn't show is how much difference it makes to just have a hand up. On POST shots, a pressured shot averages 54.3%, where a contested shot is only 42.3%, A contested screen and pop is 37.8% on average, compared to 50.5% when the shot is only pressured. Putting a hand up can make a 10% difference.

 

The Value of Contesting Shots

 

Another thing that these articles tell us is that contesting shots can make them occur later in the shot clock - where they have less of a chance of success. The deeper into the shot clock, the more likely it will end up either being blocked or ending up in a foul. I think this is a big reason that Hornacek wants to get into our half court offense earlier, and why Bledsoe has less success when he is running the team solo.

 

Having two attacking point guards on the floor at the same time gives the Suns the ability to drive and kick, drawing the defense in toward the hoop and away from our three point shooters. In our starting line-up, that can be as many as three (one of Bledsoe or Dragic), PJ Tucker, and Frye. This is the key to the Suns offense, and the reason that a traditional banger PF is not desirable in our system.

 

Spacing is important. If you can get your player more space to shoot, even by one foot, it can make for a dramatic increase in efficiency. It also affects other aspects of the game, like rebounding, particularly offensive rebounding.

 

So having Frye on the floor as our PF means that the opposing PF has to come out to the three point line to guard him - or, they switch, and have a smaller player guard him. If the PF guards him, and the corresponding others are guarded by their contemporaries, that leaves Dragic and Bledso to attack against the opposing PG and SG, and maybe the center. We know by now how good Dragic is at going against big men - it's his favorite thing. And we have learned that it takes two to guard either one of these guys when they attack - both of them can extend laterally very well (like a Parker or Ginobili), which makes their layups very hard to block. But this scenario almost guarantees that one of Tucker, Frye, or Bledsoe/Dragic will be open for a three - and open is better. Subbing in Marcus for Tucker, or Green for a PG doesn't diminish that threat much, and even Kieff, despite shooting less of them, is still a viable threat from the arc.

 

And while it's true that a PF living on the line means that he won't be getting many offensive rebounds, it also means that the opposing PF won't be getting defensive rebounds, as well. As an example, in our two wins against Portland this year, LaMarcus Aldridge has gotten four rebounds in each game - and he's averaging 11 for the season.

 

One area in which the Suns can and need to improve is that, besides Dragic and Bledsoe, we don't have a lot of drive and kick options. But the answer isn't necessarily in getting different players - I think it lies in the continued development of Goodwin and a change in focus from Green and Marcus Morris. Archie and Marcus both have very good handles, but Archie needs to improve his control and court vision (which will come with time and experience), and Marcus needs to learn to share more with people on the floor who don't have the same last name as him. Gerald is a little loose with the ball, but he's good at straight line drives, and needs to get to the rim more. The Suns also have a lot of room for improvement on back-cuts and screen cuts.

 

I started a comprehensive analysis of our backcourt, and I've found that Dragic and Bledsoe are among the league leaders in this category - but the team is still toward lower middle of the pack. Miami has 5 players in the top 50 in drive and kick success, and it's a key for their "Pace and Space" philosophy. So, even though Bledsoe and Dragic are better than just about everybody (including LeBron and Wade or Curry and Thompson or Parker/Ginobili) we need more guys to do this.

 

Miles Plumlee has been an unexpected revelation this year - even more so since he really has shown no range at all. I have great hopes that Alex Len will be back soon, and will work himself into a contributing role by the end of the year. The extra few feet of range that he would add could give our backcourt a foot or two extra to operate in, and pull the opposing center farther away from the basket, which should net in improved offensive rebounding and more points on putbacks. I am well aware of the concept of "out of sight, out of mind", but as good as Miles has been, Len was drafted because he's better. Maybe not right now, but soon...

 

The upshot of all this is, we are taking the philosophies of the most successful franchises, and incorporating them into our system. Miami and San Antonio were in the finals last year based on these principles, and we are building a team that is very consciously modeled after SA. It may sound ridiculous to compare Len to Duncan at this point, but I believe he was drafted to give the Suns exactly the kind of fundamental production that Duncan gives the Spurs - range, rim protection, rebounding, mobility, passing, and indefensible moves to the basket. The fact that we are getting quite a bit of that from Miles is just an added bonus and extra insurance.

 

Another factor that creates space is versatility. Having a player on your team that can make shots from anywhere obviously creates space, because he must be guarded everywhere. LeBron is the prime example of that. In a study compiled by Harvard Professor Kirk Goldsberry, he divided the section of the floor where 98% of field goals are attempted into 1284 separate one-foot squares, put over 700,000 of those shots within those squares, and asked the following two questions:

 

1. Who has attempted at least one shot from the greatest number of squares? In other words: Who is confident he can score from basically everywhere?

2. Who can actually score efficiently from the largest number of those areas?

 

Turns out, Kobe has taken shots from 83% of them. Dwight Howard has attempted shots from less than 25% of them.

 

The rest of the top 10 after Bryant consists of eight wing players with range and one power forward. The wing players, in order from top to bottom: LeBron James, Vince Carter, Joe Johnson, Rudy Gay, Andre Iguodala, Ray Allen, Kevin Durant and Danny Granger.

 

Not on this list are three names from recent championship teams - Paul Pierce, Dirk Nowitski, and Rashard Lewis (?). These guys top the efficiency charts, even though they didn't appear on the shot-distribution chart's top 10.

 

The league's top shooter? Steve Nash. He has scored at least 1 point per attempt from 406 of those 1284 square foot blocks, or 31.6%, covering the span from the 2005-06 season to the 2010-11 season.

 

We need to understand that this is the kind of analysis that front offices around the league are using now. I have supreme confidence that Ryan McDonough and the Suns are at the forefront of this wave. There are similar studies for rebounding:

 

Another paper looks at hundreds of thousands of rebounds to see where they go, who snares them and how high the ball is off the floor when someone finally grabs it. One little nugget from that paper: It appears the conventional wisdom that corner three-point attempts are more likely to rebound over the opposite side of the rim is incorrect. Corner threes have a seemingly random rebound distribution, like any other three-point shot.

 

How these things affect what we see when we watch a Suns game will remain a mystery for a long time. But from a layman's perspective, we can learn to recognize that:

 

McDonough knows what he's doing

 

Hornacek know what he's doing

 

The Suns are having success because they are putting themselves in a position to succeed. Better shots, more open shots, more options, more space. I've said for years that Goran Dragic was going to be a star. Amazing how much better he's gotten when he's on the floor with 4 other legit scoring options. The return of Frye, the radical improvement of Tucker, the acquisition of Bledsoe, Plumlee, and Green, and the improved utilization of the Morris Bros have made Dragic more effective and successful player. Add to that the draftees Len and Goodwin, and we have the core of a really, really good team for years to come.

 

É artigo de um fã, mas muito interessante, a meu ver explica bem a razão do sucesso dos Suns ao longo desta época. Atenção também aos links que vão estando no texto, parte deles remete para os estudos referenciados.

[Pat Riley]

Ninguém fala do Z-Bo? Prefiro-o ao Blake.

 

tava aqui à procura de um artigo e encontrei isto :mrgreen:

[Pat Riley]

Tava a olhar para as listas que se fizeram o ano passado e resolvi fazer a minha actualizada.

 

Top 20 Best PG in the NBA

 

[*] Chris Paul

[*] Tony Parker

[*] Russel Westbrook

[*] Stephen Curry

[*] Mike Conley

[*] John Wall

[*] Damian Lillard

[*] Ricky Rubio

[*] Bledsoe

[*] Dragic

[*] Lowry

[*] Jrue Holiday

[*] Kyrie Irving

[*] Ty Lawson

[*] Jose Calderon

[*] Deron Williams

[*] Michael Carter Williams

[*] Kemba Walker

[*] Isaiah Thomas

[*] Jeff Teague

 

 

Top 20 Best SG in the NBA

 

[*] Paul George

[*] James Harden

[*] Dwyane Wade

[*] Wesley Mathews

[*] Lance Stephenson

[*] Klay Thompson

[*] Bradley Beal

[*] Monta Ellis

[*] Kevin Martin

[*] Joe Johnson

[*] Eric Gordon

[*] DeMar DeRozan

[*] Manu Ginobli

[*] JJ Redick

[*] Afllalo

[*] Jimmy Butler

[*] Victor Oladipo

[*] Dion Waiters

[*] Gordon Hayward

 

Top 20 Best SF in the NBA

 

[*] Lebron James

[*] Kevin Durant

[*] Carmelo Anthony

[*] Andre Iguodala

[*] Nicolas Batum

[*] Rudy Gay

[*] Luol Deng

[*] Kawhi Leonard

[*] Chandler Parsons

[*] Josh Smith

[*] Evan Turner

[*] Paul Pierce

[*] Vince Carter

[*] Shawn Marion

[*] Gerald Henderson

[*] Jeff Green

[*] Harrison Barnes

[*] Trevor Ariza

[*] Danny Granger

[*] Wilson Chandler

 

Top 20 Best PF in the NBA

 

[*] LaMarcus Aldridge

[*] Kevin Love

[*] Blake Griffin

[*] Dirk Nowitzki

[*] Paul Milsap

[*] David Lee

[*] Serge Ibaka

[*] David West

[*] Zach Randolph

[*] Greg Monroe

[*] Pau Gasol

[*] Boozer

[*] Derrick Favors

[*] Nene

[*] Ryan Anderson

[*] Thad Young

[*] JJ Hickson

[*] Tristan Thompson

 

 

Top 20 Best C in the NBA

 

[*] Anthony Davis

[*] Dwight Howard

[*] Cousins

[*] Roy Hibbert

[*] Tim Duncan

[*] Chris Bosh

[*] Marc Gasol

[*] Al Horford

[*] Brook Lopez

[*] Bogut

[*] Tyson Chandler

[*] Andre Drummond

[*] Robin Lopez

[*] Al Jefferson

[*] M. Gortat

[*] Pekovic

[*] DeAndre Jordan

[*] Jonas Valanciunas

[*] Vucevic

[*] Larry Sanders

 

Sou gajo para me ter esquecido de muita gente. Alguns é mais preferência pessoal que outra coisa e tive muito em conta as performances este ano. Deixei Kobe, Rondo e Rose de fora por motivos óbvios.

[Perdigas]

O Josh Smith é overrated até dizer chega.

 

 

Não vejo onde seja overrated. É do melhor de entre os que não são franchise players, Iguodala style.

E isto. :mrgreen:

 

Josh :heart: :lol:

[Rafinha]

Sacramento Kings Thriving With Darren Collison

 

by Bryan Gibberman

 

Darren Collison and the Sacramento Kings are one of the surprise teams in the NBA

 

The Sacramento Kings have been the early surprise of the NBA season going 4-1 and doing it in impressive fashion.

 

They beat two playoff teams from last season in the Portland Trail Blazers and Los Angeles Clippers with the victory versus LA coming on the road. Sacramento took down the Denver Nuggets at the Pepsi Center in the second night of the back to back followed by a 131-109 romp of the Nuggets to sweep a home-and-home Wednesday night.

 

Many, including myself, thought the Kings were making a major mistake this past offseason letting Isaiah Thomas go and replacing him with Darren Collison.

 

The Kings went 19-21 in games Thomas, Rudy Gay and DeMarcus Cousins played and when the three of them were on the court together (995 total minutes/24.3 minutes per game) had a positive net rating of 1.6 with a 104 offensive rating and 102.4 defensive rating.

 

That’s not the time to start jumping up and down thinking Sacramento was on its way to a championship, but it was a clear step in the right direction. We’re talking about an organization that hasn’t accomplished a winning percentage of higher than .341 since the 2007-08 season. The Kings haven’t been .500 since 2005-06.

 

It was a curious decision Sacramento didn’t march forward with the trio listed above when Thomas could have been retained at a reasonable price. Whether they made the right decision long-term letting the more talented player leave for the Suns and replacing him with Collison remains to be seen.

 

As of now the move is paying off, but Sacrmento’s success is larger than simply moving on from Thomas to Collison despite how the statistics make it look.

 

In 125 minutes together this season (24.6 per game) Collison, Cousins and Gay have a 108.9 ORtg and 85.3 DRtg, which is a +23.6 net rating. That’s absurdly good.

 

The change from Collison to Thomas has mainly been a subtle adjustment of less is more. Isaiah’s biggest strength is at times also his biggest weaknesses. He has a unique ability to create his own shot in small spaces off the dribble. This at times leads to over dribbling and controlling the ball a tad too much.

 

Nothing in these videos is spectacular, but it’s Collison making the right basketball decision. There’s no unnecessary dribbling done by the point guard, he gets the ball where it’s supposed to go.

 

 

Thomas with the Kings last season averaged nine drives per game and Sacramento averaged 9.5 PPG on those drives. The former UCLA point guard isn’t nearly as aggressive totaling 5.3 drives per game resulting in five PPG for the Kings. Collison understands being able to break down a defense individually isn’t his strength and doesn’t attempt to do it as much. Him understanding his limitations has helped lead to more ball movement as Sacramento is averaging 21 more passes per game this season.

 

 

Putting all of the increase in ball movement on Thomas would be unfair, but you do see in these statistics how Collison is helping. He averages 5.7 more passes per game, takes 4% less of his shots with seven dribbles or more and 4.1% less of his shots come when he holds the ball for six or more seconds.

 

Gay and Cousins usage rate is up ever so slightly, 2.7% between the two. Both players are taking advantage of all of their opportunities – Gay has a PER of 27.2 and Cousins 29.9.

 

These two have become the clear focal points of the offense and Collison makes sure to keep them involved. Instead of pounding the ball into the ground he has no problem running sets without dribbling and letting the offense run through the two highest paid players on the roster.

 

 

This is where the difference between the two is noticeable. Rudy Gay’s shooting percentage is unsustainably high, but the more important aspect of the chart is the separation in volume of passes, raw passes per game and field goal attempts in each situation.

 

All of this being said the Kings offense is only a little over four points better per 100 possessions so far with Collison sliding in for Thomas as a part of the trio. With only a five game sample size that can easily swing in one game. What’s been more significant is the early improvement on the defensive end.

 

Collison came out of college known as a stingy defender playing under the slow it down, grind it out, half court style of basketball Ben Howland employed with the Bruins. This reputation eventually devolved at the NBA level.

 

The Kings have been terrific to this point and Collison hasn’t hurt them, he’s had a positive impact. Head coach Mike Malone deserves a good amount of credit for Sacramento’s defensive success. The players have bought in and they’re working hard including the often maligned Cousins. His effort has been solid through five games.

 

In the first four games this was a pretty surprising development:

 

 

On Wednesday, facing Lawson again, the Nuggets point guard shot 3-7. Collison was an annoying pest making plays.

 

 

In both of the PnR videos Collison gets good help from Cousins, whose foot speed is a strong attribute for him defending the action. Cousins help gives Collison the recovery time he needs and in both situations it ends as a successful defensive possession.

 

With the third play it’s an extreme example of Collison playing smart off-ball defense. The Nuggets poor spacing allows two Sacramento defenders to guard three Denver players above the break. Because of this Collison cheats off his man and is able to swipe the ball from an unaware Kenneth Faried.

 

Throughout this game there’s less flashy work from Collison. When defending a player on the wing he pinches in, but stays in range to be able to properly close out his man. Collison’s got his arms in the way clogging up the Nuggets penetration and passing lanes. Malone has the Kings players playing smart, heady defense.

 

The key to the Kings continuing to play above the expectations will still rely heavily upon Cousins and Gay performing at an extremely high level on both ends. They’re the two most important players on the team.

 

Through five games it’s only fair to give Collison credit for not being the detriment to the roster he was widely believed to be. Collison has done what he was brought in to do and for now has subsided the chatter of what was thought to be a major mistake.

 

http://fansided.com/2014/11/06/sacramento-kings-thriving-darren-collison/

[rozas]

Sim, os Rockets confiam demasiado nos 3s, e sim às vezes as coisas não funcionam, mas quando funcionam são jogadas bem pensadas:

 

http://grantland.com/the-triangle/james-hardens-holy-mountain-how-the-rocket-man-creates-3-pointers/

[Pat Riley]

Não vejo onde seja overrated. É do melhor de entre os que não são franchise players, Iguodala style.

 

 

O Iggy também é overrated, já agora :mrgreen:

E eu gosto muito dos dois. Mas não podes confiar uma equipa a nenhum deles, são material para championship teams mas enquanto role players. O Iggy é óptimo para teres na tua equipa a defender os Lebrons da vida, tal como o Josh. Nenhum é grande lançador, embora o Iggy tenha muito mais qualidades por ser um bom passador e não ser um headcase.

Gostaria de ter qualquer um se tivesse um ou dois grandes jogadores para liderar a equipa. Mas não gostaria de ter nenhum deles como melhor jogador da equipa, isso é um passo certo para a 8th seed e uma saída na 1ª ronda.

 

perep :prayer:

 

Que visionário.

 

É aquela discussão do inicio da página.

[Rafinha]

Firing Kevin McHale won't fix the Rockets unless the players try harder

 

Houston fired its coach after a disappointing start to the season, but nothing will change unless the players actually give a real effort.

 

There are problems with the 4-7 Houston Rockets that may never be solved. Dwight Howard may never be fully healthy for a long enough stretch this year. James Harden may never have a season as good as 2014-15. Ty Lawson may just be a poor fit next to Harden on both ends. The power forward situation may never sort itself out.

 

Those problems do not in any way explain why the Houston Rockets, a chic pick to contend for the NBA title, are sleepwalking through the beginning stretch of their season. They've already lost decisively at home to the Nets, Nuggets, Celtics, Warriors and shorthanded Mavericks, and they were on the other end of a 41-point swing in a road loss to Miami. No team has even made the playoffs after posting a point differential this poor in the first 11 games since the 2006-07 Heat, and they limped there meekly due to injuries and old age.

 

It's early, but this is a crisis. The Rockets know this, which is why they had the dreaded players-only meeting and then abruptly let go of Kevin McHale a day later. But these problems go far beyond McHale, whose departure proves the old axiom that it's easier to fire the coach than the players. He was made the scapegoat for the players' lethargy.

 

It doesn't matter who is coaching the team if the Rockets' players continue to fail in these three fundamental areas.

 

 

Commitment

 

Step 1 to fixing this problem is simple: Give an honest effort. Last year's Rockets thrived because they charged at opponents with waves of raw, frantic energy. Those same players are now standing wide-eyed as opponents fly past them in transition.

 

Transition defense is indeed Houston's biggest problem. Teams score 15.5 percent of their points against the Rockets on the break, per Synergy Sports Technology. Only the lowly Sixers and Jekyll-and-Hyde Kings have surrendered more total points on the break than Houston this season, and no team has actually stopped a lower percentage of transition opportunities.

 

The sheer number of transition chances the Rockets give up is the biggest issue. Houston is allowing teams to get 17.5 transition possessions per game this season. The Hornets are second-worst in opponent transition conversion percentage, but have surrendered just 11.3 transition possessions per game, lowest in the league. The Hornets have unheralded players who get back because they know they lack the athleticism to compensate without meticulous planning. The Rockets have stars who think they can take shortcuts and be fine. It's no accident that Charlotte has overachieved as Houston has floundered.

 

Good transition defense requires both positioning and hustle, and the Rockets have failed in both areas. The Rockets search for corner threes and aggressively attack the offensive glass, which can have unintended consequences when they don't score or grab the board. It's common to see three or even four players stuck on the baseline when a shot goes up or a player drives.

 

 

 

 

But that can't be an excuse for the players. Everyone wants corner threes now, and the Rockets have big men who are good enough to crash the offensive boards. Once the shot is attempted, those players in the corner already need to be starting their retreat. They cannot be running in for rebounds or just standing there if there are already multiple teammates doing the same.

 

 

 

 

 

Paying more attention to that detail will go a long way, but the Rockets' issues go deeper. Not only is their preparation slow, but their effort as the transition opportunity is happening is unacceptable. Too many Rockets have been caught jogging back as their man -- or at least the most dangerous opponent threat -- outruns them.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Those are five different Rockets players who were outhustled by their man on the break. There is no X's and O's fix for that piss-poor effort. Those players just need to run harder.

 

 

Communication

 

The transition issues bleed over to Houston's half-court defense. Because players aren't in the right position from the start, the Rockets must scramble to cover up holes. NBA teams are too smart not to take advantage of the Rockets' confusion to get easy scores.

 

 

 

But the attention to detail also isn't there when Houston gets a chance to set its defense. The Rockets like to trap the ball on pick-and-rolls, but the backside rotation has consistently been late, leading to layups and juicy open threes. That style of defense only works when all five players are talking, and we've seen too little of that this year.

 

The communication problem gets especially problematic when the Rockets switch assignments, which happens too frequently. Some teams switch as a power move to short-circuit a team's offensive set, but the Rockets do it out of laziness so they don't have to fight through screens.

 

This'll happen to anyone on occasion, but it happens multiple times per possession for the Rockets. They switch even if it causes a mismatch and they don't communicate their intentions to each other quickly enough when doing so. There's no reason for Harden and Howard to switch here, and even if there was, they need to talk to each other to prevent an awful breakdown like this.

 

 

This problem pollutes every Rockets lineup and probably explains why Howard hasn't been the savior he was in the past. Drivers have too much of a head start for Howard to adequately contest shots. When Howard played last year, the Rockets funneled dribble penetration to him. He's caught unprepared this year and that's enough to profoundly change his rim protection numbers. Backup Clint Capela at least has more spring in his legs, but his positioning is even worse and he too gets punished by his teammates.

 

Houston certainly has less defensive talent on the perimeter, particularly with Patrick Beverley sitting. Nevertheless, they should be performing much better than this. It starts with actually talking to each other.

 

 

Concentration

 

Talking to each other also means we'll see fewer awful lapses. The Rockets should be embarrassed by the number of times an opponent has cut backdoor on a snoozing defender. It's a plague that cannot continue.

 

Harden is clearly the worst offender. As CBS Sports' Matt Moore notes, he's devolved into Internet Meme James Harden after working hard to shed that reputation last year. The narrative of Harden's defensive improvement was always a little overblown, but there's no denying that he's averaging significantly more bloopers per game this year.

 

 

 

 

 

But it's not just Harden. Everyone has been afflicted. Lawson has been victimized.

 

 

Corey Brewer has fallen asleep in as obvious a way as Harden.

 

 

Even Trevor Ariza and Beverley, the two players counted on most to establish a defensive identity, aren't immune.

 

 

 

The lack of focus here is astounding and must be addressed. Interim coach J.B. Bickerstaff will surely point out the errors, but the onus is on the players to correct them.

 

It's amazing that a purported title contender is having trouble paying attention on defense, but here we are.

 

***

 

The evidence points to a major chemistry problem with the Rockets, which is why they felt the need to fire McHale so quickly. Coaches always take the blame when the players give such a poor effort, simply because it really is easier to fire one coach instead of 15 players.

 

Yet blaming McHale for this debacle is shortsighted. The Rockets players simply need to show more professional pride to dig themselves out of this mess. They're too talented to be playing this poorly and renewed focus on the basics will allow them to display that talent.

 

On the one side, "try harder" is a simple solution. On the other hand, what does it say about a team with such high hopes that we even have to say that?

 

http://www.sbnation.com/nba/2015/11/18/9755956/houston-rockets-kevin-mchale-fired-not-his-fault

 

Leiam também o artigo do Matt Moore (o link está mais acima) sobre os problemas dos Rockets, focando-se principalmente no Harden.

[andriy pereplyotkin]

Epá, eu acho que 90% dos problemas apresentados são precisamente culpa do treinador.

[Grillo]

eu acho que ha ai coisas, como na situação dos ressaltos, que é capaz de ter um bocado de mão do McHale, mas a falta de comunicação, os "adormecimentos", serem batidos em velocidade entre outros, a menos que tivesse sido uma tentativa de queimar o McHale, acontecem devido a uma displicência brutal por parte dos jogadores. O McHale tinha culpa era noutros aspectos, nomeadamente aquela manobra de ataque, que basicamente não existia, era chegar lá à frente e triplo ou bola no Harden. O aproveitamento do jogo interior do D12 era escasso.

 

se o problema for mesmo a displicência, e apesar de não gostar da maneira de jogar das equipas dele, o preacher era o fit obvio